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SI: Culture Digitally
Disasters are almost always a story of social inequality. 
Although they are thought to hit indiscriminately at one 
level, natural disasters have highly stratified effects affecting 
most adversely those who are already disadvantaged. Low-
income people are more likely to live in unsafe housing and 
are thus vulnerable to suffer casualties, material damages, 
and displacement. Hurricane Katrina is the typical case in 
point (Klein, 2007), but the observation is widely supported 
(Klinenberg, 2002). Crucially, the asymmetrical effects are 
not only felt during the actual disaster event but are perpetu-
ated and heightened in the recovery period. Recent studies 
have shown that the aftermath of disasters can have as, if not 
more, deleterious effects on affected populations as the origi-
nal calamity (Adams, 2013; Sheller, 2013). Recovery can be 
delayed due to corruption, profiteering, or inadequate gover-
nance leading to a second-order disaster (Adams, 2013), a 
humanly perpetuated disaster which further traps disadvan-
taged populations into precarious life conditions.
In this article, I ask whether new communication tech-
nologies can mitigate the consequences of disasters and 
disaster recovery for affected populations. I pay particular 
attention to questions of social inequality and how it inter-
sects with digital inequality. Are new communication tech-
nologies able to ameliorate the effects of “second-order 
disasters,” and if so, who benefits? Are any positive conse-
quences equally spread among better-off and socially mar-
ginalized participants?
Much optimism has greeted new communication tech-
nologies in the field of disaster research. It is even claimed 
that digital innovations such as social media are transform-
ing humanitarian relief by enabling “people-centered 
humanitarian action” which empowers disaster-affected 
communities to coordinate and respond to their own prob-
lems (World Disasters Report [WDR], 2013). This optimism 
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has given rise to the term “humanitarian technology” refer-
ring to the uses and applications of technology by disaster-
affected communities during recovery (WDR, 2013). Yet, 
despite the enthusiasm regarding the role of digital technolo-
gies as tools for disaster recovery, more evidence is needed 
to assess their impact. Parallel research in the field of Internet 
studies suggests that despite the initial optimism about the 
Internet as the “great potential equalizer” (Compaine, 2001), 
the effects of technological uptake are at best complex, while 
much recent evidence points to potential amplification of 
social inequalities (Hargittai, 2008; Hargittai & Hinnant, 
2008; Schradie, 2013).
The article draws on ethnographic research on the recov-
ery from Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) which 
struck the islands of the Philippine archipelago on 8 
November 2008. Haiyan remains the strongest storm ever 
recorded with over 6,300 casualties and more than 12 million 
people affected (National Economic and Development 
Authority [NEDA], 2013).1 Between April 2014 and January 
2015, our team2 has been conducting fieldwork in two areas 
affected by the Typhoon, examining the role of communica-
tion environments in disaster recovery. In particular, we have 
been investigating the uses of social and mobile media by 
both directly affected populations and humanitarian organi-
zations involved in the recovery process, although the article 
primarily reports on interviews and participant observation 
with affected people. By exploring the structural conse-
quences of recovery in the everyday lives of affected people, 
I here combine the macro- and micro-levels of analysis. The 
article observes sharp digital inequalities which map onto 
existing social inequalities. While some of our already bet-
ter-off participants have access to a rich media landscape 
which they are able to navigate often reaping significant ben-
efits, low-income participants are trapped in a delayed recov-
ery with diminished access to and skills to use interactive 
technologies. The fact that some participants are using social 
media to recover at a rapid pace while others are languishing 
behind represents a deepening of social inequalities. In this 
sense, digital inequality can amplify social inequalities lead-
ing to a potential “second-order disaster”—a humanly per-
petuated disaster that can even surpass the effects of the 
natural disaster (Adams, 2013). The following section brings 
together the three literatures that inform the study’s analyti-
cal framework.
When Is a Disaster? Emergencies and 
Recovery Politics
Disasters are notoriously under-theorized in social science. 
The strong emphasis on applied research acts as “a barrier to 
theoretical innovation” (Tierney, 2007). Much writing on 
disasters focuses on the events themselves and their immedi-
ate aftermath, while the historical context of disasters and the 
long-term recovery process have received significantly less 
attention (although see Bankoff (2003) for a historical account 
of disasters as a way of life in the Philippines). The tem-
porality of disaster is hugely significant. While most research 
focuses on disaster events, I argue that the drawn out and less 
spectacular process of recovery can be more harmful than the 
original event. The argument was made by Klein (2007) and 
her theory of disaster capitalism which involves an initial 
“shock treatment” to economies following events such as 
natural disasters. The outsourcing of reconstruction from the 
government to private contractors who turn recovery into a 
for-private endeavor exacerbates inequalities at the expense 
of those most in need. The “shock doctrine” in Klein’s work 
echoes Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception” and its subse-
quent applications in the field of humanitarian relief (Fassin 
& Vasquez, 2005). Fassin and Vasquez (2005) have shown 
how “emergencies” or exceptional circumstances have legiti-
mated problematic interventions and policies which would 
not have been otherwise tolerated.
Adams (2013) extends Klein’s argument by observing 
that New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina suffered a “sec-
ond-order disaster” as the recovery’s disastrous conse-
quences surpassed the impact of the storm itself. In New 
Orleans, market-driven disaster recovery became a lucrative 
business which exacerbated inequalities of race, class, and 
gender and prevented those displaced by the disaster from 
ever recovering (Adams, 2013; Adams, van Hattum, & 
English, 2009). While private contractors turned recovery 
into opportunities for profit, the real recovery was left up to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and volunteers and 
as a result was extremely delayed (Adams, 2013, p. 5). 
Meanwhile, middle-class participants were left to “pull 
themselves up by their own bootstraps” a view that they 
often internalized (Adams et al., 2009, p. 631). Katrina pro-
vided an exemplar of neoliberal capitalism understood both 
as “market-driven governance” (Somers, 2008) and a broader 
ethos of “self-governing” that values self-reliance and entre-
preneurialism (Ong, 2006). Later in the article, we will dis-
cuss how Typhoon Haiyan represents a hybrid case combining 
some of the above elements, such as state withdrawal, which 
have led to a delayed recovery. Similar to the study by Adams 
(2013), the present research documents the consequences of 
delayed recovery drawing on the actual experiences of 
affected populations. By combining the micro- and macro-
levels of analysis, I aim to understand the structural conse-
quences of long-term disaster recovery and the role of social 
and mobile media in post-Haiyan Philippines.
Humanitarian Technologies? Social 
Media in Disasters
Most work on digital media and disasters has focused on 
Western contexts (e.g. Hughes & Palen, 2009; Palen, 2008), 
thus assuming ubiquitous Internet connectivity among 
affected populations. Most studies have examined social 
media and especially Twitter (Bruns, Burgess, Crawford, & 
Shaw, 2012; Murthy, 2013), while much work has focused 
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on how “big data” can help plan and coordinate government 
responses to crises. Research has also examined the ways 
users participate in social media to share or seek information 
and coordinate action (Hughes & Palen, 2009; Palen, 
Starbird, Vieweg, & Hughes, 2010; Starbird et al., 2015), 
while studies have also highlighted the phenomenon of digi-
tal volunteerism—how distant others can offer help via inter-
active platforms (Meier, 2015; Starbird & Palen, 2011). The 
overwhelming popularity of big data approaches in disaster 
and humanitarian response needs to be weighed against the 
awareness of the ontological and epistemological limitations 
of social analytics (Crawford & Finn, 2014), such as the fact 
that they only represent active users and not necessarily 
those who are most affected and whose digital footprint may 
be too small to be even noticed. Basing recovery efforts on 
big data risks misdirecting resources from those most in need 
to those who are able to generate most “noise.” Particularly 
relevant to this study is the issue of the uneven distribution of 
big data globally. During Haiyan’s first 3 days, 230,000 
relevant tweets were collected by the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA) 
Micromappers compared to 4 million during Hurricane 
Sandy in the United States during a similar timeframe (Meier, 
2015, p. 28). In the case of Haiyan, it is safe to assume that 
most of these tweets were from outsiders “looking in” given 
that communications infrastructures in the affected areas 
were completely damaged and remained down for over a 
month after the event. One of the few studies to have looked 
at social media and disasters in a global south context (the 
Pakistan floods of 2010) found that most Tweets were from 
non-local people commenting on the events (Murthy & 
Longwell, 2013, p. 840), confirming that social media users 
are asymmetrically distributed globally. Quite apart from the 
need to develop research in the contexts where disasters 
occur most frequently, more qualitative work is necessary 
that offers an in-depth account of the actual uses of technol-
ogy by disaster-affected people. This is imperative given the 
optimism surrounding the potential of new media for human-
itarian emergencies.
The low cost and interactive nature of digital technologies 
such as SMS and social media are thought to be a “driving 
force in the new humanitarianism of today” (WDR, 2013, p. 
154). Interactive technologies are claimed to empower local 
communities, facilitate information dissemination and collec-
tive problem-solving, and improve the accountability of 
humanitarian organizations. The optimism that technological 
innovation can catalyze a shift in power relationships within 
humanitarianism underpins the term “humanitarian technol-
ogy” used by humanitarian organizations to refer to the use 
and applications of technology by disaster-affected communi-
ties “to respond, recover and rebuild more effectively” (WDR, 
2013, p. 13). Yet, there is little evidence from non-Western 
contexts to support such claims. Although the literature on 
social media and disasters is growing, what seems to be par-
ticularly missing from some of the accounts on “humanitarian 
technology” is the perspective of the affected populations 
themselves, which is surprising given the emphasis on “peo-
ple-centered action” in the above accounts. Clear evidence is 
required whether digital technologies can actually enable new 
technologized forms of resilience and recovery for at-risk 
groups and whether power is indeed redistributed. The neolib-
eral tone of self-reliance (Ong, 2006) is here coupled with a 
problematic understanding of technology as inherently pro-
gressive and equally distributed among populations. As the 
next section will highlight, technological uptake is almost 
always stratified.
Digital and Social Inequalities
Digital inequality refers to both how existing social inequali-
ties shape the adoption and uses of communication technolo-
gies as well as to how different uses of these technologies 
can influence social stratification (Hargittai & Hsieh, 2013, 
p. 141). Both definitions apply to the present research, but 
this article focuses mainly on the latter dimension for which 
there is less conclusive empirical evidence.
The debate on digital inequality has evolved from early 
conceptualizations of the digital divide as a binary category 
relating to access, to the differentiated online skills and uses 
of the web. The shift is more salient as Internet connectivity 
has become increasingly pervasive at least in the developed 
world context. DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, and Shafer 
(2004) suggested different dimensions of inequality, includ-
ing technical means (e.g. the quality of connection), auton-
omy of use (e.g. location of access), and the ability to use the 
medium effectively. The differentiation in online skills and 
the ability to take advantage of the medium’s opportunities 
are termed as the “second-level digital divide” (Hargittai, 
2002) and encompass differentiated levels of online participa-
tion and capital-enhancing activities (Hargittai & Hinnant, 
2008). Differentiated online skills (in relation to analysis, 
evaluation and content creation) are also at the core of recent 
revisions of the concept of media literacy (Livingstone, 2004) 
which also encompass access inequalities (first-order divides).
Research has established that socioeconomic status and 
education are strong predictors for the type of online activi-
ties that users pursue. A US study found that those with 
higher levels of education were more likely to pursue “cap-
ital-enhancing activities,” effectively activities that improve 
one’s life chances such as searching for financial or political 
information (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008, p. 606). Conversely, 
users of lower income were more likely to display risky 
online behavior such as gambling (Hargittai & Hinnant, 
2008, p. 607). The strong relationship between socioeco-
nomic status, education, and online skills is confirmed by 
other quantitative studies (see Hargittai & Welejko, 2008; 
Schradie, 2013), while studies have also highlighted gender 
inequalities (Helsper, 2010; Schradie, 2011), with women 
less likely to share creations on the web (Hargittai & 
Welejko, 2008).
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Although there is plenty of evidence to support how social 
stratification shapes digital inequality (including differenti-
ated access and online uses and skills), there is less conclu-
sive evidence about whether digital inequality reproduces 
social inequalities. Research suggests that digital literacy has 
implications for education (Buckingham, 2007) and employ-
ment opportunities (Fountain, 2005), while studies have sup-
ported a positive relationship between online activities and 
social connectivity (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). Links have 
also been made between seeking news online and engaging 
in political talk and civic participation (Shah, Cho, Eveland, 
& Kwak, 2005) echoing earlier arguments about news media 
and the virtuous cycle of positive reinforcement (Norris, 
2000). A qualitative study of transnational families suggested 
that differentiated access and skills can engender “care 
divides” with Internet-connected migrants better able to care 
for their left-behind children at a distance (Madianou, 2014). 
That study emphasized the range of platforms available to 
migrants and their ability to navigate media environments, 
conceptualized as “polymedia.” Users able to exploit the 
affordances of different platforms were able to report a more 
diversified experience of mothering at a distance compared 
to those with access to a limited range of media (Madianou, 
2012, 2014).
The above findings suggest that disparities in people’s 
online uses can potentially compound social inequalities rather 
than alleviate them. If some users (typically, those in already 
advantageous positions) are more skilled than others and have 
access to a range of platforms, they can take advantage of the 
web’s numerous opportunities. By contrast, users who are less 
well equipped to navigate the web (usually those who are 
already more socially disadvantaged) are less likely to benefit 
from any opportunities. As a result, online inequalities can fur-
ther exacerbate social inequalities rather than create a level 
playing field (see Hargittai & Hsieh, 2013). More longitudinal 
research is needed to evidence the implications of online uses 
for social inequalities. Additionally, more qualitative research 
is needed to understand deeply the consequences of inequality 
and complement the findings of quantitative research which 
dominates this field. Given the injuries of social inequality 
are often “hidden” (Sennett & Cobb, 1972), an ethnographic 
approach is well suited to unearth the implications of digital 
inequity. This article aims to do so by focusing on the hitherto 
understudied intersection of digital inequality and disaster 
recovery.
Most work on digital inequality has addressed Western, or 
“global North,” contexts. When addressing the developing 
world context, research has typically focused on access issues 
(usually the “global divide” between the global north and 
global south, see Norris (2001) among others) and consider-
ably less on differential literacies and uses. While the emphasis 
on first level divides is understandable given the low rates of 
Internet access in parts of the world, especially African coun-
tries (International Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2010), 
the developing world picture is very complex with several 
countries pioneering innovations and platforms. One such 
example is the Philippines, dubbed the “texting” and “social 
networking capital of the world” (Pertierra, 2010; Russell, 
2011). Countries like the Philippines and Kenya have pio-
neered mobile money applications as evidenced by the popu-
larity of the M-Pesa platform which handles almost 25% of 
Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) (The Economist, 
2012). National figures, however, conceal regional differences. 
In the Philippines, Internet use is still largely an urban, middle-
class phenomenon (Madianou & Miller, 2012) rendering 
access divides still relevant. As always, of course, growth in 
user statistics does not mean that everyone uses the medium or 
benefits from it in similar ways. I will here explore both first- 
and second-order digital divides as part of the effort to establish 
not only how existing social stratification shapes access and 
online skills but also to evidence whether digital inequalities 
heighten existing social inequalities, thus affecting the out-
comes of recovery in post-disaster Philippines.
The Empirical Context
The article draws on a multi-sited ethnography in two loca-
tions Tacloban, Leyte, and Sabay, Cebu,3 where we have been 
conducting participant observation and interviews with 101 
participants (several of whom are interviewed more than 
once) between April 2014 and January 2015. The study also 
includes interviews with 38 experts (representatives from 
humanitarian organizations, other civil society groups, gov-
ernment agencies, as well as telecommunications companies 
and other digital platform developers) which inform this arti-
cle contextually. Our qualitative sample aimed to be as diverse 
as possible while retaining a social class and gender balance 
(55 women and 46 men; 63 very low or low income and 38 
middle class). The two fieldsites were selected for a number 
of reasons. Tacloban, an urban center and regional adminis-
trative capital, suffered the highest number of casualties as it 
was where the typhoon first made landfall. Storm surge waves 
submerged most parts of the city with whole neighborhoods 
completely destroyed. Sabay, a remote island community off 
the northern coast of Cebu, suffered very significant material 
damages but few casualties as it was not affected by the storm 
surge. The article draws on data from both fieldsites, but the 
aim here is not to develop a full comparison.
Ethnography is ideal for investigating deeply the perspec-
tive and experience of affected populations which are often 
missing from the disaster literature. Ethnography is particu-
larly well suited for dealing with potentially vulnerable pop-
ulations such as those affected by disaster (Adams, 2013). 
Participant observation allowed us to develop long-term rap-
port, trust, and empathy over the course of 10 months. During 
our fieldwork, we spent time with our key participants and 
their extended families. We shared meals, sang karaoke at 
neighborhood fiestas, and attended church services, commu-
nity consultations, and protest rallies. We supplemented tra-
ditional participant observation with online ethnography in 
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order to have a full overview of our participants’ actual 
media practices.4 The long-term nature of ethnography 
allowed us to develop a close understanding of the politics of 
disaster recovery. We need more “slow research” to under-
stand emergencies. As we were able to follow developments 
for a period of over 10 months, our research does not just 
provide a snapshot of the Haiyan aftermath but a sustained 
account of our participants’ experiences and struggles over 
the course of a year. This long-term insight is vital for under-
standing the intersection of recovery and inequality.
Recovering from Haiyan: A Second-Order 
Disaster?
The first impression of Tacloban one year after Haiyan is of 
a bustling city. Most shops and hotels are back in business 
and the streets in the downtown area are clear of debris and 
congested with traffic. Schools have reopened and so has the 
main mall in the outskirts of the city which also functions as 
a social space (as is typical in most Philippine cities) while a 
new mall in the downtown area is being built. Several recon-
struction projects and events were planned in the run up to 
the one-year anniversary from the Typhoon and the Pope’s 
visit in January 2015. There are even signs of gentrification, 
with a new trendy hotel and pop-up bars and restaurants 
which mainly cater for the foreign aid workers. Yet, it does 
not take long to see the wounds that the Typhoon has inflicted. 
The evidence is not just found in the black silt—residue from 
the tsunami-like storm surge—that still covers most buildings, 
or the dust from the ubiquitous construction sites, or even the 
long queues in shops that still suggest a state of emergency. 
Just a short tricycle ride from the city center, one encounters 
a sea of tents in what used to be one of the most densely 
populated barangays5 by the shore. Like in several other 
parts of the city and wider metropolitan area, in barangay 
Lido thousands of people live without electricity, running 
water, or sanitation in what is officially described as a dan-
gerous zone because of its proximity to the sea.
One year from Haiyan, families who were most affected 
by the disaster continue to live in unsafe temporary housing 
(e.g. tents or shanties), many of which are erected in the 
affected barangays within the so-called no built zone which 
is within 40 m from the sea. From our first visits to the most 
affected neighborhoods in April 2014 until November 2014, 
we witnessed little change to the living conditions of many 
of our low-income participants, confirming delays in the 
recovery. For some participants, the only evident change is 
that the tent material got worn from usage and exposure to 
the elements, especially the rain following the start of the wet 
season (June–October). By November 2014, our main field-
work barangay of Buwan on the shore of Tacloban was evi-
dently left behind compared to other parts of the city, 
especially those along the designated route for the Papal visit 
which received concerted cosmetic intervention. In Buwan, 
the debris and large cargo ships that had been washed ashore 
and which were wedged among the makeshift homes 
remained stark reminders of the disaster. One year on, the 
ships were yet to be dismantled. The temporary homes of 
Buwan looked worn out, and unsurprisingly, some did not 
survive the strength of Typhoon Hagupit in December 2014. 
Buwan “had been forgotten,” according to the locals. It is not 
surprising then that some of our participants hoped that the 
cargo ships wedged in the neighborhood would not be 
moved. These ships, which became iconic images of Haiyan, 
remained a destination for disaster tourism which at least 
brought visitors to the barangay keen to take pictures and 
buy refreshments from the sari-sari stores. More impor-
tantly, disaster tourism and the symbols of the calamity vali-
dated the degree of desperation felt by many locals. At least 
the debris represented the reason humanitarian agencies 
would continue to visit and help the barangay. In other 
neighborhoods, those families who were transferred from the 
“no built zone” were accommodated in bunkhouses or other 
temporary accommodation described as short-term.6 It is not 
surprising that during the period of April–October 2014, 
shelter was the most pressing issue for the affected people, 
and this was made explicit in all community consultation 
meetings which we have been attending.
The other critical need during our fieldwork was liveli-
hood. Unemployment is rife especially in Tacloban where 
thousands of people lost their jobs when the companies in 
which they worked were completely destroyed. In both 
Tacloban and Sabay (where fishing is key to the economy), 
fishermen lost their boats while crops were destroyed. 
Although the local economy is gradually picking up with 
shops and other companies reopening, 11 of our participants 
who lost their jobs after the Typhoon remained unemployed 
for at least 8 months after the disaster. Almost all of our par-
ticipants were affected by unemployment as they had family 
members who lost their jobs or key income sources after the 
Typhoon.
The reasons for the slow and uneven recovery relate to a 
number of factors including political and economic. 
Recovery is very politicized involving power struggles 
between national and local government. A total of 36 govern-
ment departments are involved in the recovery process, while 
a government unit was formed in order to coordinate the dif-
ferent government departments and stakeholders in the 
recovery process. Office for the Presidential Assistant for 
Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) operates without a 
budget of its own, and apart from coordinating government 
activities and policies, its remit involves the liaison with the 
private sector and its involvement in the recovery post-Hai-
yan. Given the complexities of the recovery politics, it is not 
surprising that until 1 August, the Haiyan-affected areas 
were still officially declared to be in the “emergency phase,” 
with the government stating the launch of the recovery in 
August 2014, nine months after the Typhoon made landfall. 
The government only published its recovery masterplan on 
29 October 2014, one year after the disaster. A prolonged 
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emergency phase can provide some justification as to why 
policies are not implemented. As discussed earlier, emergen-
cies as a state of “exception” are deeply political.
It is thus not surprising that much of the actual recovery 
work has been left to humanitarian and other organizations 
such as international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs), UN agencies, or religious organizations, as was 
also confirmed by local stakeholders whom we interviewed. 
The presence of major humanitarian and UN agencies is very 
salient in both Tacloban and Sabay. Most INGOs work 
together with the Philippine government Department of 
Social Work and Development (DSWD), although some 
organizations, especially religious charities, operate autono-
mously. Private companies, including the major telecommu-
nication and media organizations, are also present in the 
recovery via OPARR, confirming the emergence of “philan-
throcapitalism” (Adams, 2013). The question is whether 
these international agencies and private companies, despite 
their dedicated efforts, can handle the recovery from an event 
of such magnitude. Haiyan represents a hybrid case combin-
ing elements from the ideology of “emergencies” and “disas-
ter capitalism” (the withdrawal of the state and the fact that 
the real recovery is handled by NGOs) all compounded by 
the local political culture of clientelism (Rafael, 1990).
It may be a little too early7 to safely conclude whether the 
recovery from Haiyan represents a second-order disaster. A 
continuous assessment of the situation is necessary for at 
least two years after the event as this will provide a measure 
of comparison with other disasters such as Hurricane Katrina 
(see Adams, 2013). However, there is already ample evi-
dence to confirm that the recovery for those most affected is 
very delayed and, in some areas, stalled. Those most affected 
by the typhoon continue to live in unsafe or temporary hous-
ing, have lost livelihood, or are unemployed and remain 
largely dependent on handouts given mostly by their rela-
tives abroad8 or INGOs and religious organizations. Such 
handouts have now dried out given that most INGOs left 
Tacloban and Sabay a year after the Typhoon, and it remains 
to be seen if and how this gap will be filled. Those who suf-
fered the greatest loss of life and material destruction were 
already the poorest people. The fact that the recovery plan 
was only announced one year after the disaster created a 
precarious situation which suggests that, unless recovery 
picks up, Haiyan could turn into a second-order disaster. The 
remaining article explores whether new communication 
technologies can provide opportunities to improve life 
chances and speed up recovery—or whether they might com-
pound the effects of delayed recovery, potentially confirming 
a second-order disaster.
Media Environments: Access and Skills
In our interviews, we asked participants to map the devices, 
media, and platforms they had access to as well as what they 
used them for. This mapping exercise revealed a sharp access 
divide, suggesting that first-order digital divides persist 
among our participants. Our analysis divided our participants 
into four categories depending on the media environments 
they had access to:
•• Media poor: no mobile phone and minimal access tra-
ditional media; no Internet connection (9 participants);
•• Minimal owners: a feature mobile phone with some 
access to traditional media but without autonomous 
Internet access (33 participants);
•• Moderate owners: a feature phone with some web 
connectivity (most typically Facebook)9 plus some 
traditional media and occasional use of Internet cafes 
(22 participants);
•• Media rich: smartphone and/or a range of other 
Internet-enabled devices plus traditional media (37 
participants).
This classification suggests that 42 out of our 101 partici-
pants (well over one-third of our sample) have no Internet 
access, while another 22 have irregular access which is heav-
ily or exclusively centered on Facebook. Almost all these are 
very low or low-income participants, while most participants 
without Internet access are women (29). Conversely, the 
overwhelming majority of middle-class participants (25) had 
access to a rich environment of communication technologies 
and platforms, with only three participants reporting no 
Internet access. Despite exceptions (e.g. 10 low-income 
users owned smartphones), our finding confirms that socio-
economic status is directly linked to media access. Our quali-
tative data concur with our ethnographic observations in our 
fieldsites for over 10 months as well as with survey find-
ings10 (Hartmann, Rhoades, & Santo, 2014), suggesting that 
these figures are likely to represent wider trends. Interestingly, 
these figures also reflect the situation before the typhoon, 
suggesting that those who lost their devices during the storm 
were able to replace what they lost by the time we inter-
viewed them.
Differentiated access is in turn directly linked to the dig-
ital skills of participants and their ability to produce con-
tent. The question of online skills becomes redundant for 
those participants without Internet access. Of the 37 partici-
pants with regular Internet access, only 24 were identified 
as advanced users, that is, users who were able to navigate 
the various platforms autonomously, search for informa-
tion, and produce content (e.g. blogs, photography, regular 
posts on social media) especially relating to the recovery. 
Advanced users would be involved in collective problem-
solving, fundraising, protest, and forms of digital storytell-
ing. Most of the 24 advanced users were middle class, with 
six low-income participants. Most advanced users were 
also male, with only six women reporting advanced content 
production. We thus observe class- and gender-specific 
second-order divides confirming patterns from other empir-
ical contexts.
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One limitation of the digital literacy literature is that it 
does not pay enough attention to the uses of feature mobile 
phones which remain the most popular device globally 
(World Bank, 2012). Our 33 participants with access to a 
feature phone (31 of whom were poor or very poor) often 
reported creative uses of their phones usually involving tex-
ting. The single most important way in which mobile phones 
made a difference was in facilitating socialities and relation-
ships of obligation which sustained a number of our partici-
pants, confirming findings with other low-income populations 
(Horst & Miller, 2006). The following sections will report on 
the uses of texting also in the context of the recovery in an 
attempt to correct the “Western-centric” bias of the digital 
literacy literature. Still we recognize the asymmetry between 
“media-rich” participants (who have access to a range of 
devices and platforms) and those who are media poor or only 
own a feature phone with no Internet capability. Having 
access to a number of devices does not guarantee digital lit-
eracy or advanced online skills, but it does provide partici-
pant the potential to manage and enhance their social 
networks and harness them for their personal advantage. The 
next section will discuss the capital-enhancing activities 
reported by some of these “media-rich” participants.
Disaster as Opportunity
In the climate of delayed recovery, do new communication 
technologies and social media offer opportunities to affected 
populations? In our research, we observed that several of our 
participants experienced Haiyan as an opportunity to improve 
or to change their lives. Usually, these were opportunities for 
business or work, while sometimes the change concerned a 
broader sense of appreciation of one’s life. Such was the 
example of Alf, a hotel manager in central Tacloban who felt 
that Yolanda set him on a path for “self-actualisation.” 
Similarly, Joe, another middle-class participant, reported that 
while before Yolanda he was too “self-absorbed,” after the 
Typhoon he “felt part of something greater” and mainly uses 
social media for community organizing and fundraising. 
Rose, a professional who was also heavily involved in local 
politics, was active in fundraising, mobilizing her Manila 
contacts to send help that she then distributed.
For other participants, the opportunities were clearly 
instrumental and status-enhancing. Bong, a Tacloban entre-
preneur, opened his restaurant and hotel after the Typhoon 
and used social media and personal networks for marketing 
and keeping in touch with humanitarians who were the main 
clients. Gus was another Tacloban entrepreneur involved in 
the hospitality sector who used social media to expand his 
business and seek new opportunities. Gus acquired visibility 
through his prolific social media use which landed him con-
tracts to host foreign journalists and humanitarian organiza-
tions during their Tacloban stints. No one exemplifies the 
theme of “disaster as opportunity” more than Ernie, a Sabay 
entrepreneur, whose charity acquired a newfound purpose 
after the Typhoon. Ernie uses social media for crowdsourc-
ing, fundraising, and extending his own personal social and 
political capital in the island community. His online activity 
intensified considerably post-Typhoon as reflected in his 
upgraded smartphone and monthly bill which increased from 
2,000 to 10,000 pesos (42–214US$), an amount that greatly 
exceeds most local monthly salaries.
Alice, a 22-year-old University student from a middle-
class background, was preparing for her final year exams 
when Haiyan struck. Although her family’s home was com-
pletely destroyed, she was able to pass her exams success-
fully a month after the Typhoon, which is a testament to her 
abilities and determination. Shortly after her graduation, 
Alice landed a volunteering job with one of the largest 
INGOs stationed in the city. She found out about this oppor-
tunity through an SMS “blast” that was sent through one of 
her friends. Although hers is a volunteering job, she receives 
a monthly allowance which is well over double the local 
minimum salary. Alice enjoys the interactions with humani-
tarian workers and spoke thoughtfully about this experience 
of self-development. This work opportunity was critical for 
Alice’s family as her allowance is the only family income 
given her father lost his job after Yolanda and remains unem-
ployed at the time of writing. This example also points to the 
precariousness of the middle class in the Philippines—in the 
absence of a welfare state, one’s status can easily slip from 
relative comfort to poverty following a life-changing effect 
(Parreñas, 2001).
Despite the differences in the above examples, almost all 
participants who spoke of “disaster as opportunity” came 
from educated, middle-class backgrounds. Although these 
participants experienced some material damage (severe in 
Alice’s case) as a result of the Typhoon, most were able to 
repair their homes and none reported casualties in the family. 
A striking similarity in these narratives is that social and 
mobile media have been instrumental in enhancing these 
participants’ life chances. Social media enabled these partici-
pants to seize opportunities to rebuild and to improve their 
lives in the recovery process. Social media do not operate in 
a vacuum but within existing social networks. Participants 
were able to maintain and exploit their existing social capital 
through their media environments. Alice found her job 
through a “text blast” while Bong, Joe, Gus, Rose, and Ernie 
harnessed their social networks in order to drum up support 
for their charity work and personal interests. Some of the 
above examples suggest that social media can be more than 
tools for maintaining existing social capital—they can also 
be constitutive in creating life chances.
Another important observation concerns the range of 
platforms employed by these participants. Most of the 
above participants exploit the affordances of a range of 
platforms to improve their position in the aftermath of 
Haiyan. So, for example, when a participant uses Facebook, 
YouTube, blogging, photography, various chat applica-
tions, as well as email and texting, then they are more likely 
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to produce a compelling narrative about their charity or 
business. Such were the cases of Joe and Ernie who run 
successful fundraising campaigns using a range of plat-
forms. This points to a rather neglected dimension of digital 
access and skills: the access to and ability to navigate a 
range of platforms, or else a polymedia environment, to suit 
one’s needs. The theory of polymedia shifts our focus from 
discrete platforms or technologies to media environments 
and the ways users navigate them in order to manage their 
needs (Madianou & Miller, 2013). I argue that a polymedia 
approach can make an original contribution to the digital 
inequality literature. Our present analysis suggests that 
those with access to and skills to navigate a polymedia 
environment have a greater chance to benefit from life-
enhancing opportunities.
Perpetuating Inequalities
Turning our attention to our poorer participants requires us 
to pay attention to what is missing. The contrast to the 
“disaster as opportunity” theme is stark as we here observe 
an absence of job opportunities or significant forms of redis-
tribution. If middle-class participants were able to use 
communication technologies and navigate polymedia envi-
ronments in order to improve their lives, by contrast the 
overwhelming majority of our low-income participants did 
not report such experiences. We have no examples of mobile 
phone or Internet use for finding jobs or for collective problem-
solving. Our earlier analysis suggests that diminished digital 
access and skills may be contributing factors. Recall that 
nine participants did not even own a mobile phone, over 
one-third of respondents had no Internet access, and the 
majority of advanced users were middle class. The argu-
ment, of course, is not simply technological. Digital 
inequality compounds existing circumstances. For example, 
polymedia allowed better-off participants to exploit and 
expand their already existing social networks. But the previ-
ous section also argued that social media can become consti-
tutive of opportunities, and for this to occur, digital access 
and skills are a precondition.
Our 10-month fieldwork allowed us to observe the 
regeneration of parts of downtown Tacloban and how the 
lives of some better-off participants were even transformed 
for the better (documented in earlier sections). During this 
time, we also observed stasis in the poorer barangays where 
people continue to live in temporary shelter waiting for 
decisions to be made about their relocation. Inaction, of 
course, quickly turns into deterioration, and this was 
certainly our feeling in our last visit to Buwan where the 
fragile shelter structures were showing the wear of several 
months’ heavy use coupled with intense weather phenom-
ena including recent typhoons. Our poorest participants 
continue to be unemployed and partly dependent on agency 
handouts, help from relatives, or irregular work arrange-
ments (such as setting up a street barbeque).
I recognize, however, that mobile phones play a role in 
the context of social practices and informal work arrange-
ments. Given that mobiles continue to be the most popular 
digital devices globally, practices such as SMS need to be 
understood in a meaningful way and inform discussions of 
digital inequality which focus exclusively on Internet 
access and skills. This matters when examining questions 
of digital access and skills in the developing world 
context. Our fieldwork revealed a wide range of uses of 
technology for sociality, recreation, and re-establishing 
routines following the disruption of the disaster. I here 
focus on the role of texting in the maintenance of social 
relationships of obligation on which our participants 
depended, a finding reported by other studies (Horst & 
Miller, 2006). Patron–client ties structure social relation-
ships in the Philippines (Rafael, 1990) and are further sus-
tained via texting. Texting requests for help was common 
among our participants as was texting blessings and reli-
gious homilies, the latter acquiring a “phatic” function as 
a form of relationship acknowledgement or greeting. 
Recipients for these messages would be powerful locals 
(“big” men or women—McKay, 2012) or relatives in 
Manila or abroad. Facebook was used similarly. The 
“like” button acquired a phatic function (essentially re-
affirming relationships) while private messaging was used 
for money requests among other things. Recall that sev-
eral feature phones had basic Facebook functionality. 
Maintaining socialities through texting or social media is 
not a trivial matter, but a serious coping mechanism in 
societies without a welfare state. The uses reported here 
achieve a degree of redistribution through remittances, 
but can also be seen to entrench existing dependencies 
between powerful benefactors and poor beneficiaries.
Relationships of dependency are also potentially engen-
dered by other social media uses which could be interpreted 
as risky. We met participants who were involved in scams 
aiming to generate money from foreigners. A more wide-
spread trend among poorer female participants with some 
Internet access was online dating with an aim to meet 
foreign men and eventually strike a better future. There are 
countless Filipino “dating” groups on Facebook alone which 
often represent a potential escape route from the disaster 
zone and the country.11 At least 11 of our lower income 
participants with Facebook-enabled phones were actively 
involved in dating practices while our Internet café 
ethnography revealed that dating was one of the most 
popular pursuits. Although these dating sites and groups 
pre-date Haiyan, they have become more popular after 
the Typhoon given the high unemployment and economic 
depression among low-income people in Tacloban. 
This phenomenon is too complex to fully address here 
(see Constable (2005) for a thoughtful account of “mail- 
to-order brides”), but such practices arguably add a 
gendered transnational power asymmetry to existing local 
inequalities.
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All these practices take place while Tacloban and Sabay 
recover at different paces. As noted earlier, the center of 
Tacloban—and the tourist resorts of Sabay—are moving 
ahead while the poorer barangays are left behind. Yet, the 
conclusion here is neither technological nor social deter-
minism. Indeed, we have one powerful example when a 
group of very low-income women managed to use texting 
to improve their living conditions. This group of women 
supported by an advocacy group targeted the local govern-
ment with an SMS campaign (a “text brigade”) so that their 
tents could be repaired. Their texting campaign was suc-
cessful while one woman, Dina, has grown in confidence 
through this experience and is now building her own home. 
Under the right conditions (in this case the presence of a 
local NGO was catalytic), digital skills can be acquired and 
put to good effect.
Conclusion
One year after the disaster, many of our low-income partici-
pants remain in temporary housing and without stable forms 
of income. Political and economic reasons have combined to 
produce a very slow—if not stalled—recovery, and the 
effects are felt acutely in the poorest barangays which have 
seen little positive change during our fieldwork. These are 
the neighborhoods that are most affected by the Typhoon. 
Conversely, a group of our middle-class participants appear 
unaffected by the slow recovery. By contrast, they are recov-
ering well and in some cases are strengthening their position 
by harnessing the potential of social media to improve their 
life chances. The fact that some participants are recovering at 
a rapid pace while others are languishing behind represents a 
deepening of social inequalities. Those who are already rela-
tively better off have access to a richer media landscape 
which they are able to navigate often reaping significant ben-
efits. By contrast, the more disadvantaged participants draw 
on a diminished media landscape and are less likely to take 
advantage of any social media opportunities. Rather than 
democratizing opportunities or creating a “level playing 
field,” the web exacerbates social inequalities by heightening 
the life chances for the better off while leaving the poorer 
participants behind. The potential of so-called humanitarian 
technologies to help disaster-affected communities “respond 
to their own problems” (WDR, 2013, p. 13) is only realized 
for some participants, but certainly not for those who were 
most adversely affected by the disaster.
Given that over one-third of our participants (predomi-
nantly low income and female) lacked Internet access while 
several did not even own a feature phone, we observe that 
first-order digital divides remain relevant in this post-disas-
ter context and are linked to digital skills. Our analysis exam-
ined the uses of feature mobile phones, recognizing that 
SMS is critical for populations without Internet access. 
Discussions of digital literacy in non-Western contexts need 
to take into account texting and other feature phone practices 
and skills. In general, the article is informed by a wider 
approach of media environments that maps and analyzes all 
communicative opportunities available to our participants 
rather than assuming the usefulness of a given platform. Our 
approach pointed to a new dimension of digital inequality 
that focuses on a participant’s capacity to navigate media 
environments. Those able to combine a range of platforms 
and navigate a “polymedia” environment embodied the 
theme “disaster as opportunity” as they explored life-enhanc-
ing opportunities that led to potential personal gain. In a 
sense, these participants are responding to the climate of 
disaster capitalism by embracing the neoliberal tenet of 
entrepreneurialism (Ong, 2006). By contrast, our poorer par-
ticipants’ personal uses of texting and social media, when 
present, do not achieve any significant redistribution. 
Although they constitute important coping mechanisms 
within the post-disaster environment, because these uses are 
steeped in already existing asymmetrical relationships within 
the Philippines and globally, they potentially entrench depen-
dencies to powerful others.
We conclude that digital inequalities amplify social 
inequalities and compound the effects of delayed recovery. 
This is a toxic mix for engendering “second-order disas-
ters”—the humanly perpetuated disasters that can surpass the 
actual disaster. Typhoon Haiyan is not a second-order disaster 
yet—but the delayed recovery can turn into one unless the 
issues relating to recovery policies and social inequalities are 
addressed. We also conclude that without digital equality, 
new communication technologies cannot be “humanitarian 
technologies.” The consequences of disaster and delayed 
recovery cannot be mitigated when technological uptake is so 
stratified, potentially amplifying existing inequalities.
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Notes
 1. The exact number of casualties is contested and not yet com-
pletely verified. For example, the 6,300 figure does not include 
missing people or those who were unidentified, bringing up the 
unofficial death toll to well over 10,000 (http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/616060/yolanda-death-toll-still-vague-8-months-later).
 2. Team members are Liezel Longboan (Postdoctoral Research 
Assistant) and Jonathan Ong, Nicole Curato, and Jayeel 
Cornelio (co-Investigators). I gratefully acknowledge their 
invaluable contribution.
 3. Sabay is a pseudonym used to protect the anonymity of our 
participants given the size of the island. All geographical 
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and other proper names have been changed with the excep-
tion of Tacloban which is a highly urbanized city (population: 
220,000) and immediately recognized as the area most hit 
by the storm surge. Although we have retained references to 
Tacloban, we have changed names of all neighborhoods and 
municipalities where we conducted fieldwork.
 4. The reason we did not include Twitter or other social media 
analytics was because of the absence of local Tweets about the 
recovery compounded by the fact that Internet was down for 
more than month after the disaster. None of our 101 partici-
pants used Twitter, a trend validated by our wider ethnography.
 5. Barangay is the smallest political and administrative unit in 
the Philippines.
 6. The politics of relocation (e.g. moving fishing populations 
in landlocked rural areas with little or no infrastructure for 
employment) is a large topic that exceeds the scope of the 
present piece.
 7. At the time of writing which is 14 months after the disaster.
 8. Overseas relatives, part of the massive flow of Filipino migra-
tion, provided much support to our participants. Typically, it is 
our already better off participants who had such connections.
 9. The major mobile phone companies offer dedicated Facebook 
packages costing 40PHP (0.8 USD) for 2 days unlimited use.
10. A survey conducted by International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) in Tacloban found that 83% of the population 
had access to at least a feature phone, but only 14% accessed 
the net via their personal devices (smartphones or personal 
computers [PCs]) (Hartmann et al., 2014).
11. The Philippines is one of the most migrant nations globally, 
with over 10% of the population working abroad.
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